Catálogo Bibliográfico

Buscá y solicitá los materiales de interés que se encuentran en la Biblioteca del Centro de Documentación e Información sobre Administración Pública

Catálogo Bibliográfico

Underground Government : the Off-Budget Public Sector / James T. Bennett, Thomas DiLorenzo

Por: Bennett, James TColaborador(es): DiLorenzo, ThomasIdioma: Inglés Detalles de publicación: Washington D. C. : Cato Institute, 1983Descripción: 184 p. : tblsISBN: 0932790372Tema(s): PRESUPUESTO | CONTROL PRESUPUESTARIO | ESTADOS UNIDOSOtra clasificación: INAP-AR:OSZ/0126 Resumen: Politicians and bureaucrats have a great disaffinity for constraints placed on their discretionary behavior, particularly with regard to their ability to spend and to borrow. Government spending permits politicians to direct benefits to their constituents in general and especially to their political supporters. Debt is favored because repayment occurs in the future (perhaps while others are in office) while the benefits of the expenditures are reaped in the present period. In the United States, both statutory and constitutional restraints on government spending and indebtedness greatly limit the abilities of politicians and bureaucrats at the state and local levels of government to spend and to incur debt. These restrictions historically arose because of the egregious fiscal excesses during the nineteenth century when canals and railroads were under construction. In the heady days of the “robber barons,” bonds were issued by state and local governments to attract the railroads, and defaults were not uncommon. To restore fiscal integrity — and the faith of investors, many of whom were foreign — statutory and constitutional restraints were imposed on the fiscal actions of governments.
Etiquetas de esta biblioteca: No hay etiquetas de esta biblioteca para este título. Ingresar para agregar etiquetas.
    Valoración media: 0.0 (0 votos)
Tipo de ítem Biblioteca actual Solicitar por Estado Fecha de vencimiento Código de barras
Libro Libro Biblioteca Central
Colección Oszlak
INAP-AR:OSZ/0126 Navegar estantería (Abre debajo) Disponible 013957

Politicians and bureaucrats have a great disaffinity for constraints placed on their discretionary behavior, particularly with regard to their ability to spend and to borrow. Government spending permits politicians to direct benefits to their constituents in general and especially to their political supporters. Debt is favored because repayment occurs in the future (perhaps while others are in office) while the benefits of the expenditures are reaped in the present period. In the United States, both statutory and constitutional restraints on government spending and indebtedness greatly limit the abilities of politicians and bureaucrats at the state and local levels of government to spend and to incur debt. These restrictions historically arose because of the egregious fiscal excesses during the nineteenth century when canals and railroads were under construction. In the heady days of the “robber barons,” bonds were issued by state and local governments to attract the railroads, and defaults were not uncommon. To restore fiscal integrity — and the faith of investors, many of whom were foreign — statutory and constitutional restraints were imposed on the fiscal actions of governments.

No hay comentarios en este titulo.

para colocar un comentario.

Haga clic en una imagen para verla en el visor de imágenes

Catálogo Bibliográfico - Instituto Nacional de la Administración Pública. Av. Roque Saenz Peña 511, Oficina 526 - Teléfono (5411) 6065-2310 CABA República Argentina.