Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Solicitar por | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras |
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Libro |
Biblioteca Central
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INAP-AR:OSZ/0126 | Disponible | 013957 |
INAP-AR:OSZ/0123 Politique et personnalité : Chateaubriand / | INAP-AR:OSZ/0125 Del macetero al potrero (o de lo micro a la macro) : el aporte de la sociedad civil a las políticas sociales / | INAP-AR:OSZ/0126 Underground Government : the Off-Budget Public Sector / | INAP-AR:OSZ/0127 La empresa pública industrial en México / | INAP-AR:OSZ/0128 Administration in developing countries : the theory of prismatic society / |
Politicians and bureaucrats have a great disaffinity for constraints placed on their discretionary behavior, particularly with regard to their ability to spend and to borrow. Government spending permits politicians to direct benefits to their constituents in general and especially to their political supporters. Debt is favored because repayment occurs in the future (perhaps while others are in office) while the benefits of the expenditures are reaped in the present period. In the United States, both statutory and constitutional restraints on government spending and indebtedness greatly limit the abilities of politicians and bureaucrats at the state and local levels of government to spend and to incur debt. These restrictions historically arose because of the egregious fiscal excesses during the nineteenth century when canals and railroads were under construction. In the heady days of the “robber barons,” bonds were issued by state and local governments to attract the railroads, and defaults were not uncommon. To restore fiscal integrity — and the faith of investors, many of whom were foreign — statutory and constitutional restraints were imposed on the fiscal actions of governments.
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