Despite the vast amount of research on the causes, consequences and mitigation of corruption, we still have little insight into why anticorruption reform occurs at a particular point in time and in a particular form. This paper proposes a framework for predicting both the ?when? and the ?what? of such reform. I argue that a series of macro-level variables, comprised of sub-level indicators, may enable us to roughly predict the timing of reform as well as the nature or scope of reform. Specifically, I suggest that reform become more likely when pro-reform agents are able to disturb the existing equilibrium sufficiently to realize change. The independent variables I propose fall into three broad categories: motive, opportunity and resources. The motive category focuses on two factors: the extent to which economic crisis or prosperity displaces corruption issues as a political priority and the magnitude of corruption scandals. The opportunity category looks at the extent to which institutional factor eithe facilitate or hinder reform and at the dynamics of the political party system. The resources category concentrates on the organizational and informational capacity of pro-reform agents. A scaling mechanism is also proposed for the dependent variable of reform scope, which includes the focus (oversight, enforcement or prevention), depth (juridical character) and breadth (jurisdictional coverage in terms of classes of actors) of the reform.

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